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Abstract Thirteen extended H2S excursions (19.64 mg/l
maximum) above the Standard Operating Limit (SOL,
6.7 mg/l), recorded for the export and onshore pipeline
systems in January 2010, contravened the Pipelines Safety
Regulations (PSR) 1996 and triggered an assessment to
determine the safety of continued operation in a sour ser-
vice condition. Sampling and monitoring results were
assessed and the pH and H2S partial pressures were found
not to align with any of the ISO 15156 SCC regions of
environmental severity (0, 1, 2 and 3). Both pipelines were,
therefore, considered safe for continued operation as long
as pH remained near-neutral above 6.5. Since pH was
found to be the main driver for SSCC risk, pH analysis has
been recommended for every pig receipt with H2S and CO2
excursions being the main triggers. Also the high risk of
HIC should be mitigated by maintaining pH at near-neutral
levels. Very low H2S levels have been achieved by pig-
ging, biociding and scavenging and low corrosivities by
adequate corrosion inhibition. Weld root hardness of the
export pipeline (295 HV10) is out of compliance with ISO
15156 hardness requirements for operating in the SCC
region 0 (275 HV10). Risk-based inspection (RBI) reviews
are recommended to determine inspection techniques and
frequencies appropriate for all susceptible weldments.




The two pipelines covered by this paper are the export pipe-
line and the onshore receiving pipeline to a processing
terminal. A central platform gathers oil from five other plat-
forms. The 3600 export pipeline then transport the co-mingled
fluids from the central platform to a processing terminal. The
export pipeline, terminating at the pig receiver, feeds the oil
into the 3600 onshore reception pipeline for processing at the
terminal. Field architectures for the entire pipeline system and
the export pipeline are illustrated schematically in Figs. 1 and
2. This asset has been in operation for 30 years.
This export pipeline is not intended for sour service and
is considered to be potentially at risk from sulphide stress
corrosion cracking (SSCC) especially at the welds and
from hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC) at the parent plate.
The onshore receiving pipeline was originally designed for
sour service. However, several chemical injection valves
were later welded-on at various locations on this pipeline.
Since the welding was not qualified and no post-weld heat
treatment (PWHT) of the heat affected zone (HAZ) was
performed, the onshore pipeline is considered to be
potentially at risk from SSCC at these weld locations.
These pipelines experienced extended H2S excursions
during January 2010, above the established safe operating
limit (SOL) of 6.7 mg/l, as summarised in Table 1.
Table 1 suggests that the H2S excursions were caused by
the following factors in combination with cleaning pig runs
which tended to magnify the effect.
a. Increased H2S levels in reservoir fluids (in varying
proportions from the five entrant pipelines) caused in
part by SRB activity from water injection.
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b. SRB activity within the pipelines (i.e. export and
onshore) and topsides.
c. Gas lift H2S concentrations.
The very high severity of safety, environmental, and
business consequences of the failure of these pipelines
combined with an equally high probability of catastrophic
failure under the current operating regime, represent a very
high overall risk scenario. The Pipelines Safety Regulations
(PSR) 1996 [1] requires that ‘no fluid should be conveyed in a
pipeline unless an SOL has been established for it’ and also
that ‘the pipeline should not be operated beyond its safe
operating limits’. On the basis of the excursion results and in
order to achieve conformity with the PSR, an assessment was
performed to determine whether these pipelines were to be
considered safe for continued operation. This paper presents
the results of this assessment.
Fig. 1 Schematic of the onshore and offshore pipeline system
Fig. 2 Schematic of the oil export pipeline
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Design and Construction
The line pipe type is Submerged Arc Welded (SAW) steel
pipe API 5L X65. The manufacturers of the pipe from the
central platform to landfall were Sumitomo and NKK,
Nippon Steel and Kawasaki Steel Corporation. The pipe
nominal thickness is 0.7500 (19.05 mm). The manufacturing
process is the Nippon steel process which involved
quenching and tempering to achieve mechanical properties
allowing a carbon equivalent (CE) of 0.34. CE is a measure
of weldability which measures the tendency of the weld to
form martensite on cooling and to suffer brittle fracture.
The manufacturers of the pipe from landfall to the ter-
minal (i.e. onshore) were Sumitomo and NKK. The pipe
nominal thickness is 0.87500 (22.2 mm). The manufacturing
process involved controlled rolling to achieve mechanical
properties, allowing a CE of 0.37.
A CE value of 0.3 or less is considered safe, while
preheat will be required for CE between 0.4 and 0.6. An
approximate value of CE can be quickly determined from
composition using the approximate relation [2]:
CE = %C ? %Mn/6 ? 0.05 or various online calculators.
Mechanism of SSCC and HIC
Sulphide Stress Corrosion Cracking (SSCC)
SSCC is caused by hydrogen ions (a by-product of the
corrosion process) forming atomic hydrogen atoms which
then diffuse into the pipeline steel/weld and embrittle the
crystal structure. SSCC then occurs when the tensile stress
(pressure surges, residual and external stresses) exceeds the
threshold stress. H2S promote diffusion of atomic hydrogen
by preventing recombination into the non-diffusable
molecular form. The following factors can increase sus-
ceptibility to SSCC [3, 4]:
• Gas phase H2S partial pressures above 0.05 psi.
• Steels, welds and weld HAZ with hardness above 275
HV (as per Table 2) or with tensile strength above
about 90 ksi (i.e. high strength steels).
• pH less than 4 in the presence of dissolved H2S.
• Temperatures in the range ambient to 82 C but most
severe in the range 6 to 49 C due to the favourable
diffusion rates of hydrogen.
SSCC can therefore be managed by controlling the
above-listed factors (summarised as pH, H2S, temperature
and hardness). However, it is obvious that the only options
available for the pipelines considered in this paper are
reduction of pH and control of H2S partial pressures below
0.05 psi.
Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (HIC)
For the export pipeline, HIC can be caused by atomic
hydrogen diffusing into the parent plate material or weld
usually at sites of inclusions, laminations, corrosion and
corrosion products. Therefore plate cleanliness is if para-
mount importance. Hydrogen sources could be from wet
welding (presenting as blisters) and low pH corrosion. The
susceptible temperature range for HIC is between ambient
to 150 C or higher [3]. HIC favours medium strength steel
locations compared with high strength locations such as
welds. HIC failures can be initiated without any applied
external stress since cracking would be nucleated by the
stress field at the tip of the inclusion. Once initiated, crack
propagation can be promoted by pressure surges, residual
and external stresses.
Table 1 Summary of historical H2S and SRB excursions
Years





Sessile SRB (in pig
wax) Planktonic SRB (in pig water)
2006 6.7 6.9–8.2 No spike Medium and large spikes
2007 7–8.7 No spike Large and extended spikes
2008 6.9–10.3 1 small spike Large and extended spikes
2009 6.79–9.26 1 medium spike Large spikes
2010 6.98–19.6 No spike Large spikes up to 03/2010. Thereafter no spikes following
pigging and biociding






Longitudinal seam weld metal/HAZ 230
Butt weld metal and HAZ internal (root) traverse 250
Butt weld metal and external (cap) traverse 275
Butt weld HAZ internal external (cap) traverse 275
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Analysed samples of oil pipelines which has been in
operation for more than 28 years, were found to have
degraded mechanical properties (plasticity and fracture
resistance) for up to 2 mm of the surface depth, caused by
repeated and co-joint mechanical loading and hydrogen
ingress of oil pipeline metal [5]. This suggests that oil
pipelines in end-of-life service (especially for poorly
inhibited and high H2S environments) have increased
susceptibility to HIC [6].
HIC cracks will nucleate at inclusions near the internal
pipeline surface (for example Si, Al oxides), corrosion pits
(as evidenced by Fe2O3 and FeS deposits indicating H2S
activity) and weld defects. The initiated cracks will then
propagate in a microstructure and texture dependent path,
e.g. from HAZ into the pipeline metal. Micro-fractographs
have revealed increased branching within the pipe metal.
During testing of X80 steels, HIC was found to occur
without any applied external stress and to be associated
with high hydrogen diffusivity and trapping density at
room temperature. It is specifically sensitive to Si and Al
oxide inclusions in the microstructure [7]. For X70 pipeline
steel, HIC was found to be significantly more sensitive to
the oxide inclusions than the nitrides, with crack propa-
gation also being microstructure-sensitive [8]. Very similar
results were obtained for HIC behaviour of X100 pipeline
steel [9] and the same pattern should be expected for X65
pipeline metal.
HIC-resistance is also highly dependent on crystallo-
graphic texture with strong h111i ND fibre textures
produced by hot-rolling showing significantly increased
HIC-resistance compared to h001i ND and close-to-ran-
dom textures which are HIC-prone [10].
Traidia et al. [11] developed a finite element model for
predicting HIC in steel pipelines which accounts for
hydrogen diffusion, pressure build up, crack extension, pH
and H2S partial pressure. They found that HIC is reduced
when the pH increases and the partial pressure of H2S
decreases.
The required HIC-resistance qualification testing to
NACE MR0175/ISO15156 [4] and acceptance criteria and
testing methods to NACE TM0284-2003 [12] was not
performed for the X65 parent plate and welds. This is
considered a significant risk for the operation of this
pipeline.
Results
Historical Corrosion Testing Results
In order to achieve adequate resistance to SSCC, the
specifications for the linepipe and bends for the export
pipeline including the seam and girth welds should meet
the full requirements of ISO 15156 and applicable com-
pany standards. This includes restriction on composition
and hardness limits (Table 2).
However at the time this pipeline was laid, the maxi-
mum hardness requirement of the weld HAZ was 320 HV.
Corrosion Testing of Parent Plate material
Prior to commissioning, samples of the 0.7500 and 0.87500
pipe from NKK and the 0.7500 pipe from Sumitomo were
corrosion tested for resistance to SSCC and HIC in
accordance with ISO 15156 and using the test methods of
NACE TM-02-84 [12]. Results showed a small degree of
cracking for the NKK steels and no cracking for the
Sumitomo steels.
Corrosion Testing of Parent Plate material
Prior to commissioning, no samples of the longitudinal
seam weld metal/HAZ were corrosion tested for resistance
to SSCC and HIC. No butt weld samples (weld metal, root,
cap and HAZ) were tested. However, weld qualification
tests gave weld root hardness values of 290–297 HV which
met the then company acceptance criteria for non-sour
service (\320 HV), but exceeded the current ISO 15156
limits for sour service shown in Table 2.
In summary, the entire export pipeline was not origi-
nally intended for sour service. On the other hand, the
onshore pipeline was originally designed for sour service.
Monitoring/Sampling Results
Throughput
Three out of five stabilisation trains on the terminal were
decommissioned due to significant and progressive reduc-
tion in throughput. There has been a simultaneously
upward trend in the measured levels of H2S. This is likely
to be associated with reservoir souring from sea water
injection over the life of the field (30 years).
A steady decline in throughput is observed for each
entrant pipeline except for pipeline E which has seen a
gradual increase since 2006. However from 2006 to date,
there was only one H2S excursion recorded for this pipe-
line. Pipeline B is identified as the major contributor of H2S
to the export pipeline due to the relatively high throughput
combined with high H2S contents.
Enumeration of SRB (Sessile and Planktonic)
Figure 3 shows that from 2006 to 2010 planktonic SRB
counts in pig water samples significantly exceeded the
threshold (100 MPN/ml). The enumeration method used
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was the serial dilution ‘Most Probable Number’ technique.
It is evident that planktonic SRB activity within the pipe-
lines contributed a significant proportion of the H2S spikes
experienced for 13 consecutive days in January 2010, ris-
ing to 19.65 mg/l on 22/01/2010 (Figure 3).
Figure 4 shows a largely flat trend and infrequent
excursions of sessile SRB counts in the pig wax, from 2008
to 2010. Microbial corrosion is most likely to have become
established at some pipeline locations. This is consistent
with 2008 intelligent pigging results indicating the pres-
ence of internal corrosion pits.
Historical trends (not shown) also suggest that Tetrakis
hydroxymethyl phosphonium sulphate (THPS) contribu-
tions/carry over from the entrant pipelines were not
effective in controlling the bacterial population in the
export and onshore pipelines. This was attributed to
incompatibility with several third party entrant inhibitors
resulting in significant reduction in efficiency. SRB bac-
terial colonies in both pipelines were therefore largely
uncontrolled for long periods and would most likely have
contributed to the extended H2S excursions recently
experienced.
H2S and Pigging
Figure 5 shows an almost linear increase in the average
H2S levels from December 2008 to January 2010 when
extended excursions were recorded. The historical fre-
quency of contravention of PSR) 1996 above the SOL
(6.7 mg/l) are as follows: 13 times in January 2010 up to
19.64 mg/l, 6 times in February 2010 up to 9.10 mg/l, once
in March 2010 and 3 times in July 1020 up to 13.07 mg/l.
There were also 5 excursions in total in 2009 up to
9.26 mg/l. The original provision of the corrosion man-
agement strategy (CMS) document was to run a clean pig
every 10 days. However low flow rates (approximately
0.2 m/s), meant it took the pig 12 days to arrive (i.e. from
the central platform to the pig receiver, Figs 1, 2). Pigging
Fig. 3 Trend of planktonic
SRB in pig water samples
Fig. 4 Trend of sessile SRB in
pig wax samples
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frequency deviations were also not risk assessed and mit-
igated as recommended. It was, therefore, proposed to
mitigate the extended H2S spikes by injecting biocide
during the next pigging campaign. This was carried out
1 month after the 2010 excursions with a brush pig laun-
ched and followed 48 h later by 4 h of biocide injection
from the water injection pump. Halfway through, a scrap-
per pig was then launched. Figure 5 show that this specific
intervention successfully reduced H2S levels significantly
below the SOL.
The relevant operator of each stream into the export
pipeline has been instructed to resume execution of a long-
standing recommendation to inject liquid H2S scavenger
when H2S levels exceed 4.5 mg/l. This should be continued
until the levels fall below this threshold value. This mea-
sure would provide a safety net and ensure that the export
and onshore pipelines were not operated above the SOL
(6.7 mg/l) in contravention of PSR 1996. Any breach of the
SOL will automatically incur an improvement notice and a
prohibition order if further breaches are recorded prior to
close-out of the initial improvement notice. The terminal
operator will not accept the fluids from the entrant pipeline
until the prohibition notice is lifted.
CO2/Corrosivity/pH
The trend in Fig. 6 shows that the CO2 concentration was
largely flat-lined within specification (0.25 mass%) at 0.05
and 0.0 mass% during 2009 and 2010. This is typical of the
trend obtained for all data pre-dating 2008. The absence of
any CO2 excursion for both pipelines during this period
correlates with results of very low fluid corrosivity for the
same period.
Table 3 presents the results of the Ten-Ion analysis of
pig water samples taken on 22/06/2010. High acetic acid
concentrations (known to increase CO2 corrosion rate)
were found to be present in the fluid samples. When the
concentration of free acetic acid reaches 57 ppm, corrosion
rate triples and remains constant until 171 ppm [13]. This
can be explained by the ability of the acid to decrease pH,
increasing the solubility of Fe2? and hence reducing the
thickness of the carbonate layer.
Fig. 5 Trend of H2S contents
(mg/l) vs. threshold
(SOL = 6.7 mg/l)
Fig. 6 Historical trend of CO2
concentration
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Laboratory results of corrosivities of pig water samples
(0.02 mm/year, 0.02 mm/year and 0.003 mm/year
obtained Sept 2004, Nov 2005 and Aug 2007 respectively)
shows that they were well within the design intent of
\0.1 mm/year. These corrosivity results suggest that the
pipeline is adequately protected from CO2 corrosion.
However it cannot also be inferred that microbial corrosion
or underdeposit corrosion were not occurring.
The low CO2 and corrosivity results are consistent with
the near-neutral pH of 6.7, 7.9 and 7.6 obtained in 2004,
08/03/10 and 03/04/10, respectively. For purposes of this
assessment, it should be noted that there was no historically
recorded pH result that was below 6.5. In summary, the
near-neutral pH levels was the result of low CO2 and high
bicarbonate concentrations (e.g. 3638 and 1836 mg/l in
Table 3).
BS&W
Figure 7 shows that significant water cuts were recorded in
January 2010 (40.67, 36.01 and 10.39 mass%). This cor-
relates with the significant H2S excursions of the same
period. There were only 11 BS&W excursions (up to 31.27
mass%) during 2008 and 2009 otherwise most of the
sampled results were within specification. The trend sug-
gests that since the low number of BS&W excursions
correlated with low H2S levels, a relatively lower risk of
SSCC is indicated. Therefore H2S levels in the water cut
and consequently the risk of SSCC can be significantly
reduced by maintaining BS&W levels below the 5 mass%
threshold.
Corrosion Inhibitor
Corrosion inhibitor (CI) levels of the co-mingled fluids (in
the export and onshore pipelines) were never analysed due
to suspect accuracy of the blend of different CI types.
However high CI concentrations have been historically
recorded for each of the entrant pipelines in addition to the
low corrosivity results presented in ‘‘CO2/Corrosivity/pH’’
section. This suggests that both pipelines receive adequate
corrosion protection. Microbial and pitting corrosion at
underdeposit locations could not be ruled out given the
possibility of biocide and inhibitor shielding, respectively.
Discussions
Assessment of SSCC Risk
According to NACE ISO 15156, X65 is not at risk of SSCC
when operating in the SCC Region 0. The environmental
limits are shown in Fig. 8 to be between 2.5 and 6.5 for pH
and up to 0.3 kPa (0.05 psi) for H2S partial pressure.
Results presented in ‘‘CO2/Corrosivity/pH’’ section
showed that the recorded pH were 7.8 and 7.9 during 2009
and 2010, respectively, and historically never dropped
below 6.7. It is evident from Fig. 8 that pH would have to
be less than 6.5 for the pipeline material (X65) to move
into any of the SCC regions of environmental severity (0,
Table 3 Results of ten-ion analyses of pig water samples











Fig. 7 Historical trend of
BS&W
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1, 2 and 3). On the basis of these recorded pH results, it
will be safe to conclude that the 2010 H2S excursions (up
to 19.64 mg/l) did not represent a SSCC risk for both
pipelines. Sampling and analysis of pig water pH is,
however, strongly recommended for every pig receipt in
order to monitor when the pH falls below 6.5 and hence
constitute an operational SSCC risk. Whenever H2S
excursions occur, the pH values obtained should be used to
determine the SCC region of environmental severity and
assess if there is an enhanced and continuing risk of SSCC.
Increased CO2 levels would potentially reduce pH hence
off-spec CO2 concentrations will be an important trigger
for pH sampling and analysis. It is important to note that
when off-spec CO2 levels combine with high levels of
acetic acid (currently seen in the fluids), steep reductions of
pH below 6.5 could potentially occur and consequently
move the SSC risk into an undesirable region of SCC
severity.
The SOL for both pipelines was calculated as 6.7 mg/l
in 2005 using the HYSYS simulation [14]. This value
corresponds to the ISO 15156 requirement that the H2S
partial pressure should be less than 0.3 kPa (0.05 psi) in
order to achieve resistance to SSCC. In other words, the
line pipe material will not be considered to be at risk of
SSCC when the H2S partial pressure is below this value.
Given that the determined SOL value of 6.7 mg/l corre-
spond to H2S partial pressure of 0.05 psi, it can be deduced
from Fig. 8 that the maximum H2S excursion (19.64 mg/l)
experienced on 24 January 2010 would move the pipeline
into the more severe SSC Region 1, if pH fell to less than
6.5. Under environmental conditions of pH and H2S partial
pressure, the risk of SSCC would increase and pipelines
operating in this region will require selection of materials
and weldments which are more stringent than for Region 0.
However, the pH and maximum H2S spike levels during
the extended excursions did not align with any of the SSCC
regions of risk severity. Both the export and onshore
pipelines are not considered to be at risk of SSCC and are
consequently considered safe for continued operations.
In order to provide resistance to SSCC, NACE ISO
15156 also requires compliance with the hardness limits for
the parent metal, weld root and weld cap for pipeline
operation in SCC Region 0. The welding procedure qual-
ification tests for the X65 pipeline material recorded a weld
root hardness of 275 HV10 conformed to the then company
standards (\320 HV10) 30 years ago but exceeds the cur-
rent NACE ISO 15156 requirements (B250 HV10). The
weld qualification hardness data for the other test locations
shown in Table 2, were not provided. It is likely that there
are localised weldment hard-spots which will represent an
ongoing operational risk for both pipelines.
In the event that the export and onshore pipelines
operate in SCC Region 1 (given the levels of excursion of
pH and H2S partial pressure) ISO 15156-2 Annexe A,
Section A.4.3 [4] states that for service in the Region 1
environment, ‘‘yield strengths of up to 550 MPa (80 ksi)
have proven acceptable. Typically fabrication and field
weld hardness should not exceed 300 HV’’. On this basis,
the weld root hardness of 275 HV10 for the export pipe-
line is considered to conform to the specified hardness
limit for Region 1. For the onshore pipeline, no PWHT
was performed for the welded-on chemical injection
valves which fail to meet ISO 15156-2 requirements that
‘the hardness of carbon and alloy steels shall not exceed
22 HRc and should be used in one of four heat-treatable
conditions’ (ref). In view of the risk presented by this
Fig. 8 SCC regions of
environmental severity
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non-conformity, it is recommended that RBI frequencies
should be reviewed and possibly increased if pH and H2S
partial pressures move the SCC region of severity from 0
to 1. It is also recommended to develop an inspection
plan that will ensure that the critical weld locations
(100% for the export pipeline and all chemical injection
welds for the onshore pipeline) receive adequate inspec-
tion coverage.
Based on the results and the specific recommendations
in this section, the export and onshore pipelines were
considered to be safe for continued operation.
Assessment of HIC Risk
Since initial HIC testing of the parent plate and welds were
not performed, it is likely that the risk of HIC would have
further increased on account of the pipeline being operated
for 30 years and being subject to degraded mechanical
properties within 2 mm depth of the pipeline internal sur-
face. Adequate corrosion inhibition and pigging is
recommended in order to ensure that the pipeline is
essentially free of corrosion and corrosion products which
would increase the risk of HIC. Existing defect locations
identified during the 2008 ILI should be investigated and
inspected for possible initiation and crack propagation.
HIC is reduced when pH increases and the partial
pressure of H2S decreases. Therefore, it is recommended
that pH should be maintained at near-neutral levels (above
6.5), while reducing H2S levels to very low levels by
continued implementation of current planned pigging and
biociding which has significantly reduced H2S levels to less
than 2 mg/l (August 2010).
General Conclusions and Recommendations
The operational risks of these pipelines and which poten-
tially increases susceptibility to SSCC and HIC are:
• H2S excursions above the SOL and up to 19.64 mg/l.
• No butt weld samples originally tested for SSCC-
resistance.
• Weld qualification (hardness) test results exceeding
ISO 15156 limits for sour service.
• Export pipeline not designed for sour service.
• Onshore pipeline except the chemical injection welds
are designed for sour service.
• Pipeline is in end-of-life duty and, therefore, more
susceptible to HIC damage.
The following measures were recommended for main-
taining H2S levels below the SOL and hence minimising
the risk of SSCC.
• H2S scavenging by all entrant pipelines until H2S levels
are reduced to less than 4.5 ppm. Contravention will
incur an improvement notice. Further contravention
prior to discharge of the improvement notice will attract
a prohibition notice.
• Implementation of specified pigging frequencies (every
12 days) accompanied by biocide injection.
• BS&W levels should be maintained below the speci-
fication threshold of less than 5 mass%.
Results of sampling analysis found that pH levels have
been historically near-neutral (above 6.5) and corrosivities
were also low corresponding to adequate corrosion inhibition.
The risk of SSCC was found to be low given that his-
torical pH and H2S results did not align with any of the
SSCC regions of environmental severity (0, 1, 2, 3). pH
testing should be undertaken during every pig receipt
(especially during H2S excursions) and an assessment
subsequently performed to determine whether the pipeline
operates in undesirable SSCC regions of severity 1, 2, or 3.
The high risk of HIC is minimised by maintaining pH at
near-neutral and H2S very low using the mitigation meth-
ods recommended above.
On the basis of the pH results and as long as pH remains
above 6.5, both pipelines have been considered safe for
continued operation.
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